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Regulatory Uncertainty and the Natural Gas




The United States is in the midst of a natural gas boom, but it’s unclear how long
this high level of extraction is sustainable given the regulatory trajectory around carbon
emissions and climate change. This paper examines how natural gas firms perceive
regulatory uncertainty as measured by their capital expenditure. Using rig count data
as a proxy for natural gas capital investment, I explore different ways to measure the
perceived threat of state-level regulation and differing firm responses. I find strong
evidence that regulatory uncertainty decreases the capital investments of firms, although
I find that the effect of proposed regulation declines after about four months.
1
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank the Economics department at Oberlin College.
Faculty that personally advised the research phase of my thesis—Martin Saavedra, Evan
Kresch, and Kenneth Liao—were essential to getting my thesis to where it is today. I would
also like to thank the rest of the department for their insightful feedback and careful editing:
Barbara Craig, Ron Cheung, Hirschel Kasper, Edward McKelvey, Viplav Saini, and Chris
Cotter.
I am grateful for administrative assistant Terri Pleska’s work, both in terms of explicit
organizational work for the department, and in terms of the kindness and emotional support
she provides to students.
I’d like to thank my fellow honors students for their friendship and comradery. Special thanks
to Claire Coleman, for pushing through a fever to attend the Midwest Economics Association
conference with me. I hope we all stay in contact no matter where we go.
I’d like to thank my family—Marin, Laurence, and Thea—for their support. Marin (PhD)
has served as my first point of reference for all academia-related questions, among (many)
other things.
I’d like to thank the Jerome Davis fund for financial support in travelling and presenting my
research. Finally, a thank you to anyone who has listened to me rant about my research and
given me feedback or emotional encouragement in this process.
2
1 Introduction
Natural gas has risen from a hydrocarbon side-product to a central and politically contentious
element of US energy policy over the past 10 years. Since the discovery of hydraulic fracturing,
natural gas output in the US has skyrocketed while costs declined. New geographical frontiers
of gas drilling were surveyed and drilled, and America’s energy infrastructure pivoted to
consume the incoming flood of cheap natural gas. Natural gas was sold as the “bridge fuel”
of a green future and the savior of US energy independence. In the midst of all this, much of
America’s coal industry was driven to bankruptcy.
At the same time, the specter of climate change has increasingly pressured national leaders to
make commitments to reduce carbon emissions and chart a path towards a renewables-based
economy. The supremacy of natural gas cannot last forever. The question is: is the “bridge
fuel” ready to cross the bridge?
There is a large amount of uncertainty regarding issues of climate change and regulation.
This paper attempts to measure some of the uncertainty around natural gas regulation and
quantifies the responses of natural gas firms. In particular I examine the years 2000-2016,
the time that hydraulic fracturing was entering popular use.
I measure natural gas firm responses through a set of panel data on state-level drilling rig
counts. These data are a suitable proxy for the capital investment of natural gas firms and are
a way to measure firm expectations of future profitability. To measure regulatory uncertainty,
I use a database of state-level legislation and select for bills relating to natural gas. Instead of
looking at when bills pass, I instead look at when bills are first proposed. I interpret periods
of high legislative activity (around natural gas) as periods of high regulatory uncertainty.
I use a panel analysis to estimate the effect of increased legislative activity on variation in
rig counts, and control for several key variables. I find that there is a strong and significant
relationship between legislative activity and rig counts. A month after a bill relating to
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natural gas is proposed in a state legislature, the change in natural gas rigs in that state is
reduced by an amount between 0.3 and 1. However, five months after a bill proposal, I find
that states actually see an increase in rig activity. I hypothesize that this effect is due to
suppressed drilling activity “catching up” after a sudden decrease in regulatory uncertainty
when the legislative session ends.
2 Literature Review
Historically, natural gas has been a tightly regulated commodity. Until 1978, natural gas had
been price-controlled by the federal government which created shortages in some regions and
stunted the growth of the industry relative to oil (Joskow 2013). Following the oil shocks of
the 1970s the government began to deregulate the natural gas market, allowing prices to rise
to market value. During this process, there was a small bubble in natural gas markets as
customers switched to gas from oil and back again during the 1979–1980 oil crisis. Regardless
of this price fluctuation, Congress continued to deregulate wellhead prices and incentivize the
growth of the pipeline transportation market. By the end of the 20th century the US natural
gas market was well developed—setting the stage for its robust growth in the next decade.
It was known for many years that there were large natural gas deposits buried in shale in
various places in the US, but it wasn’t until the late 1990s that this gas became profitable to
extract. Several technological developments came together—namely advancements in drilling
technology and the invention of hydraulic fracturing—to make shale gas production a reality.
Shale gas grew explosively: in Texas, shale gas production increased from almost nothing in
2000 to about five billion cubic feet per day in 2013. (Joskow 2013, p340) The natural gas
boom has been strategically important to the United States in terms of energy independence
and the balance of trade, but it has not been without controversy.
Joskow (2013) notes that many new drilling projects are taking place in states that did not
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have a regulatory framework or precedent for natural gas extraction. (Joskow 2013, p341) In
addition, there has been public resistance to the idea of natural gas drilling. The resistance
to natural gas is in response to both concerns about the safety of hydraulic fracturing (or
“fracking”), and concerns about the global climate change trajectory.
Already, the natural gas boom is coming up against obstacles. Blohm et al. (2012) estimates
the how existing policies, regulations, and land use impacted access to natural gas in the
Marcellus shale region in New York and Pennsylvania. While estimates of “technically
recoverable reserves” of natural gas ranged from 141 and 489 trillion cubic feet, about 48%
of those reserves were deemed inaccessible for various reasons. The amount of inaccessible
reserves has most likely increased since then—given that New York banned fracking entirely
in 2014.
The growth of inaccessible reserves has necessitated an industry response. A rapid supply-side
expansion combined with massive pressure to regulate have resulted in a shaky equilibrium.
Gas extraction is a capital intensive business with long time horizons, and may therefore be
vulnerable to regulatory threat.
Engau and Hoffmann (2011) provide a broad overview of the literature around responses
to regulatory uncertainty, especially relating to climate regulation. There are a variety of
possible responses to regulatory uncertainty, which have varying applicability to the natural
gas market. Some possible responses are very direct—simply involving a reduction in firm
output—and some responses, like firm restructuring, are more difficult to measure.
Engau and Hoffman use a survey sent to firm leaders, asking about uncertainty and firm
responses. They argue that the oil and gas industry is less likely (relative to other industries)
to pursue adaptation strategies in response to uncertainty surrounding climate regulation.
This is probably because carbon emission is so fundamental to what the oil and gas industry
does, and adaptation is not really a possibility. Regardless, the paper predicts that more
regulatory uncertainty will induce a larger firm response.
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In renewable energy generation markets, Fabrizio (2013) finds that energy firms invested
less in states that were perceived to have a high “regulatory instability.” Fabrizio measures
regulatory instability by looking at the history of state legislatures, and whether they had
flip-flopped on key regulatory issues. When states had a history of passing and repealing
legislation relating to renewable energy, investments were diminished.
Ritzenhofen and Spinler (2016) provides a theoretical basis for the relationship between
regulatory uncertainty and the renewable energy generation industry. Investment behavior in
anticipation of regime switch depends on the relative levels of profitability between the two
regimes. When there is minimal difference between the profitability of two regimes, regulatory
uncertainty only reduces investments. However, when regulatory uncertainty threatens to
change a highly profitable industry into a less attractive one, investors increase investments
to capture the benefits of the profitable regime while it still lasts.
Literature varies around how to measure regulatory uncertainty empirically. Fabrizio treats
regulatory instability as a constant that varies between state legislatures but that is invariable
over time. However, this is a limited way to measure regulatory uncertainty.
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) are perhaps at the forefront of measuring policy uncertainty.
Baker et al. create a synthetic measure of broad “economic policy uncertainty” through a
combination of three components: (1) textual analysis of widely read newspapers, (2) expected
dates of federal tax code changes from the Congressional Budget Office, and (3) dispersion in
professional forecasts of key macro variables. Baker et al. show that this synthetic measure
is correlated with real macroeconomic variables like growth and unemployment.
If regulatory uncertainty is treated as measure that can both change over time, and that may
vary between industries and legislatures, the question of firm response gets more complex. Is
the natural gas industry optimally responsive to regulatory threat? The oil industry appears
to be optimally responsive to oil prices, which vary unpredicably over time just like regulation.
Kellogg (2014) estimated how oil company investment was impacted by oil price volatility in
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Texas and determined that the empirical response closely aligned with the optimal response
predicted by theory. An increase in price volatility corresponded with a decrease in well
drilling—basically a decrease in firm capital investment.
This pictured is complicated by expectations of future volatility. The firm response is
dependent on how the firm conceptualizes volatility in the long-term. If volatility is believed
to have a random walk behavior, the optimal response is different than if volatility is believed
to have a mean-reverting behavior. When mean-reverting assumptions are applied, Kellogg
finds that firms will optimally respond less strongly to changes in volatility. (Kellogg 2014,
p1723) To generalize this, Kellogg finds that business threats that are expected to be short-
term incur a smaller response. Business threats that are expected to hang around for a while
incur a larger response.
Schuwerk and Sussams (2016) provide a perspective for what this might mean in terms of
regulatory uncertainty. Looking at how the coal industry has been impacted by climate
regulation, They argue that coal firm expectations vastly underestimated regulatory risk.
Coal companies underestimated risk by using assuming “business as usual” forecasts for
coal demand, ignoring ongoing development of a carbon budget plan for the United States.
Regulatory uncertainty was underestimated because firms failed to see a larger regulatory
trajectory, “mistaking the forest for the trees.” Observed coal demand fell well below industry
expectations when a number of key environmental regulations were installed by the EPA,
driving some firms to bankruptcy.
This paper attempts to expand existing literature on supply-side reactions to regulatory
uncertainty by allowing uncertainty to vary over time and space, and by focusing specifically
on natural gas. I take inspiration from Kellogg’s (2014) modelling of volatility expectations,
and attempt to apply these findings to regulatory uncertainty while acknowledging some





The production of natural gas, like oil, is an industry with very high fixed costs. Firms may
spend months and up to 10 million dollars on a well before any returns are seen. (Hiller
2016) However once a well is drilled and the wellhead is installed properly, the investment
will usually produce natural gas for the next decade or so. It is extremely cheap to maintain
a well once it is producing, and difficult to increase production in an already-drilled well.
Because of this, Kellogg finds that firms do not alter production rates or delay production in
response to price changes. The decision to produce oil or to wait is made it at the start of
the drilling process, which Kellogg models as a fully irreversible investment. (Kellogg 2014,
Ponce and Neumann 2014 p10)
There is huge variation in natural gas withdrawals across states. This is largely due to the
geological distribution of accessible natural gas deposits. The Marcellus shale formation sits
below Pennsylvania and New York, however political backlash has prevented New York from
exploiting or even measuring its deposits. The deposits run southwest across the US, pooling
thickly around Texas and reaching into Louisiana and Oklahoma. In the west, Wyoming
draws a lot of gas from the Green River Basin located in the southwest corner of the state.
In the north, Alaska extracts large volume of natural gas as a byproduct of oil production.
However, a lot of Alaskan natural gas does not make it to market on account of logistical
costs. Added together, these states make up more than half of US natural gas production.
(EIA)
The drilling process can vary widely in costs and time, depending on the geological and
regulatory aspects of the site. First, the area is surveyed and land rights are purchased. This
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process can take around six months. Mapping and staking-out the well pad can take another
month or two. Once this is complete, drilling can begin.
The first stage of drilling just goes below the water table, and a cement casing is laid in the
hole to separate the gas that comes up from the local aquifer. (This well casing is not always
failsafe and is one cause of concern for regulation.) Then, the well is drilled far deeper to
reach the natural gas deposits deep in the earth. It takes about one month to get this far with
drilling. For conventional wells, this is largely the extent of the process. Once the deeper,
secondary drilling process is finished, natural gas will flow up the well and be collected by
the wellhead for the next 1 to 30 years.
Conventional drilling techniques are usually used on sandstone or limestone formations, where
the natural gas is pooled together in large quantities. The well does not need to open a very
large surface area underground because natural gas will just naturally flow up from the large
pool. Unconventional drilling is usually used on shale formations, where the gas is spread out
into many tiny deposits across many layers of shale.
Unconventional drilling has powered the recent natural gas boom through its more intensive
drilling process. Once the well is dug deep enough into a shale formation, the drill is turned
sideways and bores outward for a mile or more. This horizontal drilling increases the amount
of natural gas pockets that the well can pull from, but it takes another two months to
complete after the vertical drilling is done.
After all drilling is finished, a natural gas firm may choose to use hydraulic fracturing on
a well. First, small explosions are set off deep in the shale, exposing more of the rock to
the well and perforating it. Then, 2 to 9 million gallons of chemicals, sand, and water and
pumped into the well at very high pressures. This pressurized “fracking fluid” fractures the
shale exposed to the well, forcing open small pockets of natural gas sealed within the rock
formation. The fracking fluid is another concern that has spurred state regulation, especially
because the chemical contents of fracking fluid are proprietary and confidential. The whole
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fracking process only takes about a week, and then the well is ready to start producing. The
combination of horizontal drilling and fracking can double the costs of well digging, but it
can also double or quadruple the amount of gas produced which makes fracking well worth it
for producers. (Bezruchenko 2015, Investopedia, Shalefield Stories)
Recently, there has been interest in the practice of “refracking,” or fracking a well that has
been in production for several years. Some wells that seemed like they were running dry have
seen a massive boost in production after a secondary round of the fracking process. However,
results are inconsistent, and the technology is underdeveloped. (Moser 2015) Refracking may
be an emerging way for natural gas companies to vary well production in response to external
conditions, but it has not achieved widespread use yet.
Baker Hughes, a drilling technology company, publishes a weekly count of all the oil and
gas rigs that are active across the country. For Baker Hughes, any rig equipment that is in
motion and drilling is counted as “active,” while equipment that is in transit or resting is
“inactive.”
Within the context of the drilling timeline described above, rigs are marked active after the
plot has had about 6 months of planning. Once a well starts getting drilled, the rig will
remain active for 1-3 months depending on the type of extraction used. Then, the rig will go
inactive while the well produces gas, for 1 to 30 years.
Viewed on the macro level, the most striking thing about the rig count data is that rig counts
have drastically declined in recent decades. (See Figure 1) The annual change in rig counts
has been negative since 2011. (Bezruchenko 2015) However, this picture is complicated by
the massive recorded increase in production output. This growing disparity can be explained
by an increase in productivity, mainly brought about by fracking.
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Figure 1: Gas rig counts vs. natural gas production. Source: Perry (2013)
It’s clear, then, that a rig count in 2000 will not mean the same thing to an oil firm as a rig
count in 2014. Because the productivity of rigs (and drilling costs) are constantly changing,
the number of rigs is not an easily comparable measure of capital expenditure from natural
gas firms.
On the monthly or weekly margin, however, rig counts provide useful information about
capital investment. The decision to start drilling a well is based on the expected profit from
the well. The decision can be delayed or expedited depending on expectations of the various
costs and revenues associated with natural gas.
In a paper modelling oil drilling, Kellogg (2014) uses a simple model based on drilling costs
and gas prices. Regulation (and regulatory threat) enter the model through drilling costs,
via multiple mechanisms. Procedural regulations can increase compliance costs and tax
regulations directly raise prices of factor inputs.
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I assume natural gas firms are price-takers in this paper, which is a simplification of real
market dynamics. Kusnetz (2011) estimates that there were roughly 14,000 oil-and-gas
companies in 2009 drilling in the US, many of them small businesses. The multinational
drillers have name recognition and some power over the market, with the 10 biggest drillers
accounting for one-third of all production. Half of domestic natural gas can be traced back
to just 40 of the US’s biggest natural gas firms. However, the highly commodified nature of
natural gas and the presence of robust regional utility markets preclude most concerns about
price manipulation.
3.1.2 Consumption
After the gas is extracted from the well, there are more steps before it can be sold to
consumers or manufacturers. The raw gas must be processed and refined, and it must be
transported to market. Transportation of natural gas has emerged as a political hot topic,
because of environmental concerns over pipelines. Natural gas can be transported in pipelines,
pressurized in trucks, or cooled and liquified for extended trips.
Pipelines are the most cost efficient form of transportation but as it stands, the current
infrastructure is not well equipped to deal with the large volumes of gas produced. The
construction of additional pipeline infrastructure has high marginal returns, and is being
pushed aggressively by the industry.
Regulation (and regulatory threat) around transportation of natural gas could certainly
affect drilling decisions. The decision to approve a natural gas pipeline could stand to reduce
distribution costs and make drilling more profitable. However, projects in involving infras-
tructure often cross state boundaries and affect huge geographical areas. These projects are
overseen at a federal level, and involve extensive government/firm cooperation. Additionally,
these projects function on a time scale of decades rather than months. For these reasons, I
assume that my analysis of state-level regulatory uncertainty is unaffected by issues involving
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transportation of natural gas.
Finally, the gas works its way through the distribution system to the customer. Natural
gas is purchased by both households and firms for three primary purposes: heating, energy
generation, and transportation. There are readily available alternatives for all three of these
applications, making demand for natural gas pretty elastic. There are some infrastructure
costs associated with switching to natural gas, but natural gas prices have been so low that
many customers are making the switch. (Kusnetz 2011)
Demand for natural gas is highly seasonal, peaking in the winter for heating. Despite this,
gas prices and production don’t seem to display seasonal patterns. (Production tends to
decrease for the month of February, but this is a small effect.) This is made possible by
natural gas storage facilities, which pump large quantities of gas into caverns underground
in the summer and withdraw them in the winter. The gas in storage is separated into base
(cushion) gas, which is needed to maintain adequate reservoir pressures, and working (top
storage) gas, which gets taken in and out.
The storage volume of working gas in the US usually peaks at about 3.5 trillion cubic feet in
October, and gets withdrawn down to 1 trillion by March. To give these numbers context,
monthly natural gas production in US varied between 2 trillion in 2007 to 2.8 trillion in 2016.
(EIA)
3.2 Regulatory Uncertainty
The study of regulatory uncertainty is complicated by the fact that defining regulatory
uncertainty is almost as difficult as quantifying it. Regulatory uncertainty is an intangible
force that can lock up markets and prevent capital investment. Because regulation can impact
markets in so many different and indirect ways, the uncertainty preceding a regulation can
be based around uncertainty of a regulation’s impact as well as the uncertainty around the
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regulation’s approval.
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) make a good effort to measure macro-level policy uncertainty
as it changes over time. The authors use multiple indicators to derive their measure of
“Economic Policy Uncertainty” (or EPU), but the one relevant to this analysis is an index of
search results from 10 large newspapers across the country. The more often that newspapers
use certain keywords involving public policy, the higher the measure of EPU gets. The
authors then show that this indicator has a significant relationship to real macroeconomic
variables. An increase in EPU precedes a decline in economic growth and employment over a
period of months. The wide variety of keywords that Baker et al. use capture a diversity of
public policy issues, which is too broad for this analysis. Instead of using the same measure
of EPU, I take inspiration from the approach but apply different keywords to a different
dataset.
Instead of analyzing the text of newspapers, I analyze the text of state legislature documents.
Specifically, I look at the quantities and dates of proposed bills that mention the words
“natural gas.” This is an imperfect measure of regulatory uncertainty, but captures some
amount of state regulatory activity that precedes actual regulations, in line with Baker et
al.’s textual analysis.
While I use the term “regulatory uncertainty,” Baker et al. use “policy uncertainty.” Fur-
thermore, Schuwerk and Sussams (2016) measure “regulatory risk” and Fabrizio (2013) talks
about uncertainty in relation to “regulatory instability.” Because of the diversity of vocabulary
used on this subject, some specification might be necessary. Although these terms are closely
related, they measure slightly different things. I see regulatory uncertainty as a subset of
policy uncertainty. Policy can consist of expenditures, taxes, and other things that affect
businesses, but regulation is the most direct application of policy from a firm’s perspective.
The three terms “uncertainty,” “instability”, and “risk” all describe situations where there are
multiple outcomes that could effect firms. I use “uncertainty,” because sounds more neutral,
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and could describe positive outcomes as well as negative outcomes. Knight (1921) attempts
to distinguish between risk and uncertainty even more concretely by saying that “risk applies
to situations where we do not know the outcome of a given situation, but can accurately
measure the odds” and that uncertainty “applies to situations where we cannot know all the
information we need in order to set accurate odds in the first place.” (Dizikes 2010) Finally, I
see instability as a sub-type of risk.
Separating the three terms is somewhat futile, considering the crudeness of my variable.
Other academic literature is not entirely consistent about these definitions. However, I hope
that it will clarify the framework of my model and possibly contextualize other research that
has been done in this area.
When discussing regulatory uncertainty, sometimes it can become unclear how strong the
effects of regulation actually are. Because there are different ways that regulation can impact
natural gas firms, and the mechanisms can be direct or indirect, the issue can seem very
abstract. For a specific example of regulation’s powerful impact on extractive industries, I
point to Schuwerk and Sussam’s (2016) work on the coal industry. Schuwerk and Sussams
chart the decline and bankruptcy of the coal industry since 2005 and argue that environmental
regulation played a key role in the financial ruin of coal firms. The authors point to 7 key
regulations implemented by the EPA “aimed to mitigate the detrimental environmental and
human health consequences of coal burning.” (p35) These regulations had a demand-side
effect, which severely decreased price and quantity after 2011. The authors admit that it is
difficult to prove the causality of these regulations on a macro scale, the authors posit that
they had a sizable effect.
How does regulatory uncertainty vary over time? From the perspective of a natural gas firm,
when is it safe to start drilling again? Empirically, this is difficult to measure accurately.
After a bill is proposed in a state legistature, any number of things could happen: (1) the bill
could pass, or (2) it could fail, or most likely, (3) it could get tied up committee proceedings
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while clearing the field for other regulatory legislature to get pushed through. It isn’t clear
how long and how hard any state legislature will push for regulating any given industry.
However, through looking at how the natural gas industry responds to legislative threats, one
can get a picture of the industry’s own model for evaluating regulatory threats over time.
The industry’s own expectations for regulation aren’t always borne out in reality. Looking at
how the coal industry has been impacted by climate regulation, Schuwerk and Sussams (2016)
argue that coal firm expectations vastly underestimated regulatory risk. Coal companies
underestimated risk by using assuming “business as usual” forecasts for coal demand, ignoring
ongoing development of a carbon budget plan for the United States. Regulatory uncertainty
was underestimated because firms failed to see a larger regulatory trajectory, “mistaking the
forest for the trees.”
When it comes to the nuts and bolts of state legislatures, they function very similarly to
the US Congress. What complicates matters is that states vary on the details of this model.
All state legislatures except Nebraska are bicameral, which means that they have an “upper
house” and a “lower house,” comparable to the House and the Senate.
Bills are introduced in one of the houses when the legislature is in session. A bill will have a
“first reading,” and then be referred to a committee. The committee will work on the bill. If
a bill doesn’t die in committee, it will finally (after a number of readings) be brought to the
house for a vote. Once one house passes a bill, it must pass over to the other house and be
passed there. Finally, once a bill has been approved in both houses, it must be signed by the
governor. The governor has veto power, although it may be overridden by some majority of
the members of each house.
In the dataset for this paper, only about 13% of the bills introduced have been signed and
passed into law. Others have been lost at various points in the legislative process–being
signed in one house but not the other, or simply dying in committee. Sometimes, a bill with
the same name and substantially the same text as bill from a previous legislative session
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is introduced to a legislature, essentially reintroducing a bill for the current session. When
reintroduced bills are treated as a unit, the success rate of bills increases to 18%.
It’s also important to note that regulatory activity is highly seasonal. This is because most
state legislatures come into session in mid-January, leading to a jump in bill proposals in
February. States set the dates of their legislative sessions independently, so some states
like Louisiana have legislative sessions in the summer. Texas, Montana, Nevada, and North
Dakota are unique for only having a legislative session on odd-numbered years, leading to an
increase in legislative activity in these years.
4 Data
4.1 Regulatory Uncertainty
In order to estimate regulatory uncertainty for a given state at a given time, I use the Open
States database of state legislation. This database is updated by the Sunlight Foundation,
who make a good effort to simplify differences across state legislatures and their online APIs.
State legislatures vary significantly both procedurally and in record-keeping, but the basic
path of a bill from introduction to signature is shared.
Using the search term “natural gas” on the Open States API returns 1348 bills in 50 different
states, about 30% of which are reintroductions (bills with identical titles to previously
introduced bills).
It can be extremely difficult to deduce the intent of a bill from the title. Some bills are
forthright about their intent to restrict the growth of the natural gas industry, but others
seem to merely address small procedural considerations around drilling. Some bills are crafted
to seem innocuous in language while dramatically changing the industry playing field. Hiding
the intent and implications of bills through bureaucratic and indirect language is a staple of
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politics, but can make research difficult. This problem is intensified by the sheer quantity of
bills at hand.
For the purposes of this paper, I assume that the “average” bill is one that restricts the
natural gas industry in consideration of environmental impacts. This is a large but not
unfounded assumption. At a basic level, one of the roles of the state legislature is to regulate
at the expense of industry and at the benefit of environmental public goods. The majority
of bills are created in order to add more regulation on the natural gas industry, not to take
regulation away. A close examination of some of the bills in the database seems to bear this
out. Although not all bills could be examined, a random sampling of bills seems to assure
the regulatory role of new state legislation. (See table in Appendix.)
A surprisingly large amount of bills deal with the consumer side of the natural gas industry:
gas distributers, utilities, and electricity generators. These bills would indirectly affect the
capital investment of natural gas drillers, although the effect would probably be smaller.
These bills sometimes include subsidies of natural gas development, to ensure its supremacy
over coal. However, of the bills that address natural gas drilling or pipelines directly, the
language is almost exclusively negative.
It is also worth remembering that the bill data is meant to measure regulatory uncertainty,
not just regulation. Any proposed bill related natural gas would raise the level of uncertainty
while the bill is active in session. Uncertainty measures the variation in possible outcomes,
but not explicitly if these outcomes are positive or negative. I treat the proposal of a bill
on a certain date as a measure of increased regulatory uncertainty at the time that it was
proposed.
There is a large amount of diversity in the regulatory regimes for each state. Some states
have a high amount of regulatory activity, where others have none at all. New York stands
out with 201 bills overall, and Pennsylvania is a distant second with 151. Regulatory activity
peaks in 2013, and declines afterward. As regulations become successfully enacted, the need
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for additional regulation may decline. This might explain the declining number of bills,
























Figure 2: Proposed bills by year and state
Figure 3: Bill counts by progress through legislature
4.2 Natural Gas
I use natural gas “rig counts” as a measure of industry’s capital investment over time. Since
the decision to drill a rig is a form of capital investment, the number of actively drilled rigs is
a good measure of aggregate capital investment by state.
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Baker Hughes, a drilling technology firm, publishes weekly data on the number of active
natural gas rigs by location and type. The number of rigs varies widely between states, which
align with the relative well output of different states.
These panel data are recorded and aggregated in a number of different ways by Baker Hughes.
One tally measures relative numbers of natural gas rigs and oil rigs in the country. Another
divides rigs up geographically by state. Unfortunately, Baker Hughes does not provide
long-run data that divide rigs by both type of fuel and state. The micro-data that do allow
this type of specification only go back to 2011.
The decision to specify a specific drilling operation as “natural gas” or “oil” can be subjective in
certain cases, as Baker Hughes notes. Because most wells output a mix of both hydrocarbons,
the classification is solely based on the rig permit is issued by the state’s permitting authority
through the judgement of the rig operator.
Because of these difficulties, the rig count data that I use does not distinguish between oil


























Figure 4: Active rigs by year and state
Baker Hughes speculates briefly on their FAQ page what factors might influence rig counts.
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While “the strength and stability of energy prices” is the primary factor, they also list (1)
technological improvements, (2) natural disasters, (3) seasonal weather and spending patterns,
and (4) political environment as other major influencers of rig counts. In my analysis, I
attempt to control for the other factors listed, in order to estimate how a particular facet of
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Figure 5: Average rigs vs bills proposed by state
Viewing rig data in relation to the bill data and removing the time dimension gives some
idea of the relationship between the two datasets. New York is a very high regulator, but
never actually drilled that many gas wells. Pennsylvania and Texas emerge as the two
states essential to this analysis, since they are both high regulators and high drillers. This
chart provides no evidence of causality, but does give a high-level perspective of the relative
placement of various states.
In order to look at how rig counts are affected over time by regulatory uncertainty, I use
marginal rig counts instead of absolute numbers. Specifically, I derive the change in rig counts
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by month for all states. Many states only tend to use one rig at the time, so the change in rig
count will vary between 1 and -1. High-volume drillers like Texas use many rigs, and change
in rigs varies from -150 to 50. Negative changes in rig counts seem to happen more quickly
than positive changes, leading to higher negative changes in the distribution. This is visually
evident from the saw-tooth shape of rig counts when graphed over time. (See Figure 4.)
In order to integrate bill data with rig data, I create a statistic of the number of bills proposed
each month in each state and merge those monthly observations into the rig observations.
Many monthly observations of bill activity are 0, meaning that the bill data are highly skewed
to the left.
I also experiment with dividing bill data into two groups: “original bills” and “unoriginal bills.”
My bill dataset includes many bills that are reintroductions: bills that were not passed in
previous legislative sessions and so are brought up for re-consideration by the legislature. By
separating the reintroductions out, I can measure the effect of reintroductions independently
from the effect of original bill proposals.
4.3 Price and Gas In Storage
As control variables, I pull data from the Energy Information Administration on both gas
prices and gas in storage. The EIA is a government bureau that collects and archives a
number of statistics relating to natural gas markets.
For gas prices, I use EIA data on futures prices. A future is financial contract to buy a given
commodity at a certain price at some point in the future. Futures are used to “lock-in” prices
for commodities like natural gas. Because of this property, markets are incentivized to value
futures as the expected price of the commodity in the future.
When natural gas firms are making a decision to drill, they are not basing the decision on
current prices. Instead, they base that decision on their expectation for future gas prices.
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Futures, then, are ideal for my model which aims to predict drilling decisions. The time delay
of futures also circumvents issues of simultaneity.
I use an EIA contract that is valued at the expected price of natural gas 1 month in the
future. The prices are not discernably seasonal, but instead tend to fluctuate pretty randomly
month-to-month. Gas prices look like they capture some macro-economic cyclical activity,
and the variable appears to be a good control that captures a lot of exogenous context.
I assume the same price for every state in my model. Although gas prices do differ regionally,
they differ by a set amount that should be equal to the cost of transportation. States that
are far from natural gas resources have higher gas prices, but these prices are higher by a
consistent amount over time.
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Figure 6: Price for Contract 1 natural gas futures
For storage, the EIA publishes a weekly tally of the amount of working gas in underground
storage. The amount of gas in storage fluctuates on a seasonal basis, which is what evens
out demand and keeps prices from fluctuating seasonally. The EIA changed their regional
categorizations for gas storage in 2010, so I patch two EIA data sources together in order to
get coverage for all the years studied.
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I use nationally aggregated storage data instead of state-level data, because I assume that
transportation costs are minimal for natural gas. The decision to drill for more gas might
depend on how much gas is already in storage, but the distance between the driller and the
















Figure 7: National working gas in underground storage
Table 1: Summary statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Rig count (oil and gas) 9,635 28.726 98.993 0.000 946.000
Rig count (gas only, post-2011) 1,007 26.755 48.472 1.000 350.333
Change in rig count 9,588 −0.011 4.904 −156.500 49.250
Change in rig count (gas only, post-2011) 943 −0.748 3.855 −29.200 19.750
Bills proposed in month T 9,635 0.129 0.807 0 22
Original bills proposed 9,635 0.090 0.522 0 10
Unoriginal bills proposed (reintroductions) 9,635 0.040 0.491 0 18
Gas in storage (Trillion Cubic Feet) 9,635 2.505 0.803 0.686 4.026
Price for 1-month future (per Million Btu) 9,635 4.932 2.264 1.812 13.455
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5 Model
Because rig counts are a good way to observe the level of capital investment of natural gas
companies, change in rig counts is a great way to observe investment responses to external
stimuli. In this paper, I attempt to study the response of natural gas firms to regulatory
uncertainty.
I quantify regulatory uncertainty as the number of bills proposed within a certain state during
a certain month, and examine how the presence of those bills affects natural gas firms over
time. An essential part of the strength of this model is the randomness of bill proposals.
Although the decision to propose a bill is not a purely random treatment assigned by the
state legislature, the exact date of a bill proposal is random. The difference between filing a
bill on June 30th and July 1st is mostly unsubstantial for a state legislature, but the random
variation in filing times allows my model to estimate the effects of these bills.
My first model is the simplest. I estimate the effects of bills proposed in t-1 (or last month)
on the change in rig count in the current month. The dependent variable (change in rig
count) is also affected my control variables: expected prices, gas in storage, time trends, and
month fixed effects. In this equation, ExpectedPricet refers to the expectation of what the
price will be in t+1, which is observed in time t.
(1) ChangeInRigCountstate,t = β0 + β1BillsProposedstate,t−1 + β2ExpectedPricet +
β3GasInStoraget + β4TimeTrend+MonthβF E + εstate,t
In my second model, I have 6 different bill variables, to measure the lagged effects of regulatory
uncertainty. When a bill is proposed in time t, the effect (if any) will show up in β1 a month
later. A month after that, the bill is two months old and the effect (if any) will show up in
β2, and so on. This lagged estimator effect continues 6 months back from the date of the rig
count observation.
(2) ChangeInRigCountstate,t = β0 +
∑6
n=1βnBillsProposedstate,t−n + β7ExpectedPricet +
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β8GasInStoraget + β9TimeTrend+MonthβF E + εstate,t
I also include five more regressions to test the robustness of my results. First, I include state
fixed effects. Since states vary dramatically in rig activity, controlling for state fixed effects
allows the dependent variable to shift up or down depending on where it is being observed
geographically.
(3) ChangeInRigCountstate,t = β0 +
∑6
n=1 βnBillsProposedstate,t−n + β7ExpectedPricet +
β8GasInStoraget + β9TimeTrend+MonthβF E + StateβFE + εstate,t
Then I experiment with my gas-specific rig data. The Baker Hughes data that spans my entire
time range (2000-2016) lumps together both oil and natural gas rigs. This is inconvenient,
because I can’t observe the difference between gas rig responses and oil rig responses. As
an alternative, Baker Hughs offers natural-gas-specific rig counts with observations from
2011-2016. The gas-specific data cuts down on the number of observations because of the
limited time span. However, I run a regression with these data simply to compare results. I
experiment with both one-month and one-to-six-month lag effects.
(4) ChangeInGasRigCountstate,t = β0 + β1BillsProposedstate,t−1 + β2ExpectedPricet +
β3GasInStoraget + β4TimeTrend+MonthβF E + εstate,t
(5) ChangeInGasRigCountstate,t = β0+
∑6
n=1 βnBillsProposedstate,t−n+β7ExpectedPricet+
β8GasInStoraget + β9TimeTrend+MonthβF E + εstate,t
Finally, I experiment with separating my bill dataset. I hypothesize that original bills are
more powerful than reintroduced bills, since they are more unexpected than reintroduced
bills. I separate original bills from unoriginal bills and measure the effects of the two types
separately. I experiment with both one-month and one-to-six-month lag effects.
(6) ChangeInRigCountstate,t = β0+β1OriginalBillsProposedstate,t−1+β2UnoriginalBillsProposedstate,t−1+
β3ExpectedPricet + β4GasInStoraget + β5TimeTrend+MonthβF E + εstate,t






β15TimeTrend+MonthβF E + εstate,t
6 Results
My first regression provides strong evidence that regulatory uncertainty has a measurable
effect on natural gas investment activity. (Table 2) An additional bill proposed in the previous
time period decreases the change in rig count by almost 0.5 rigs, which means that 2 bills
in a month will lead to a state taking one more rig offline than they would otherwise do.
Surprisingly, the regulatory effect is larger than the price effect.
The 6-month model complicates this picture. One to two months out, the effect of regulatory
uncertainty is measurably negative. At three to four months, the effect becomes insignificant.
However, at five months out, the effect becomes measurably positive. Why would bills being
proposed five months ago positively affect current rig counts?
I hypothesize that this effect could be due to the ending of legislative sessions. Most legislative
sessions last between 40 and 120 days. After two months, some of the legislative sessions
in my dataset will have ended. At 5 months, a larger group of states will have retired their
session. Only the full-time legislatures would potentially circumvent this effect. Once a
legislative session has ended, the bills that were proposed but not passed in that session are
killed. They must be reintroduced to be brought back into play.
I hypothesize that legislative session timing could be leading to the positive effect of bills
proposed five months ago on rig counts. Rigs that had been suppressed by regulatory
uncertainty over the past five months are freed, and they all spring into action at once.
Although month dummies are not included in the tables, they are highly significant and
positive for April through September. When I also add in state dummies in model 3, none of
them are significant, and they have a minimal effect on the other coefficients.
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Bills T-1 −0.487∗∗∗ −0.417∗∗∗ −0.435∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.073) (0.074)
Bills T-2 −0.218∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.077)
Bills T-3 −0.095 −0.106
(0.077) (0.077)
Bills T-4 0.052 0.041
(0.077) (0.077)
Bills T-5 0.242∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.077)
Bills T-6 0.054 0.036
(0.073) (0.074)
Futures price 0.118∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Gas in storage −0.066 −0.052 −0.061
(0.172) (0.174) (0.175)
Time trend −0.010 −0.009 −0.006
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant 19.840 16.300 11.685
(28.852) (30.408) (30.607)
State dummies 7 7 Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,588 9,353 9,353
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.016 0.012
Residual Std. Error 4.869 (df = 9572) 4.909 (df = 9332) 4.919 (df = 9286)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The regression with the data on gas-only rigs has a severely limited number of observations,
but the results are surprisingly similar. (Table 3) Regulatory uncertainty still seems to have
a measurable and a large effect on rig counts. While the short-term effect of bill proposals is
negative, the positive effect after five months still applies.
When only observing gas rigs, the estimated effect of gas prices is understandably a lot higher.
Additionally, my gas storage and time trend coefficients become larger and more significant.
This increased specificity of gas-only rigs benefits the R-Squared of my model, which increases
from 0.016 to 0.069.
Surprisingly, month dummies become insignificant with gas-rig-only data. Perhaps this is
because they were capturing a seasonality in oil rig counts that isn’t present in the gas-only
data. The estimated constant also shifts dramatically, which is probably balanced out through
the new predictive power of the three control coefficients.
When I separate original and unoriginal bills, I find that original bills have a much stronger
effect on rig counts. (Table 4) I hypothesize that original bills are a stronger representation of
regulatory uncertainty, because they can’t be anticipated in the same way that reintroduced
bills can.
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Futures price 1.470∗∗∗ 1.496∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.346)
Gas in storage 1.114∗ 1.135∗
(0.672) (0.671)




State dummies 7 7
Month dummies Yes Yes
Observations 943 943
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.069
Residual Std. Error 3.732 (df = 927) 3.719 (df = 922)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Original Bills T-1 −1.065∗∗∗ −0.949∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.107)
Original Bills T-2 −0.505∗∗∗
(0.109)
Original Bills T-3 −0.271∗∗
(0.109)
Original Bills T-4 0.033
(0.109)
Original Bills T-5 0.378∗∗∗
(0.109)
Original Bills T-6 0.137
(0.107)
Unoriginal Bills T-1 0.190∗ 0.192
(0.114) (0.127)
Unoriginal Bills T-2 0.080
(0.134)
Unoriginal Bills T-3 0.017
(0.136)
Unoriginal Bills T-4 0.072
(0.136)
Unoriginal Bills T-5 0.010
(0.134)
Unoriginal Bills T-6 −0.007
(0.127)
Futures price 0.114∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025)
Gas in storage −0.094 −0.098
(0.172) (0.174)




State dummies 7 7
Month dummies Yes Yes
Observations 9,588 9,353
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.024
Residual Std. Error 4.856 (df = 9571) 4.891 (df = 9326)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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7 Conclusion
This paper provides a small but intriguing window into the “mind” of a natural gas firm.
Firms are constantly evaluating the outside world, calculating risks, and responding in order
for their own self preservation. By observing how firms respond to certain inputs, economists
can learn a lot about the nature and context of those inputs.
This paper attempts to measure the firm response to the somewhat unquantifiable idea of
“regulatory uncertainty” Although regulatory uncertainty is less tangible than other things
that natural gas firms might respond to, its “realness” is confirmed by the fact that firms
seem to respond to it so strongly.
However, just because firms respond strongly to regulatory uncertainty does not mean that
their response is efficient or well calibrated. The natural gas industry is at a crossroads at
this point in time, and the industry’s place in relationship to developing climate policies is
uncertain. Although I observe a measurable response from natural gas firms in response to
state legislative behavior, it is difficult to understand or completely quantify what these firms
are responding to or how they should respond.
I find the fact that the response to legislation disappears in two months somewhat concerning.
These results seem to say that natural gas firms are responding to regulatory uncertainty in
the short term, but aren’t looking at the larger regulatory trajectory of natural gas in the
US. As international negotiation around climate change continues, perhaps the situation will
change.
Aside from waiting for more data, there are a number of additional directions I hope to take
this project. Firstly, I want to dig deeper into the falloff in effect significance that happens
after two months. I hypothesize that these effects are caused by the behavior of legislative
sessions. To investigate this, I hope to incorporate session data into my model in various
ways. I also hope to go beyond state legislatures, and perhaps model regulatory uncertainty
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with the state executive branch, or through another more exotic proxy.
A better understanding of the uncertainties on the horizon will allow firms and policymakers
to better prepare and adapt for the future. The stakes of international energy policy are high,
and it would be best that our society–with all its vices and all its virtues–could choose the
most socially optimal path for its own posterity.
8 Appendix




disposal, or storage of wastewater,
wastewater solids, sludge, drill
cuttings or other byproducts from
natural gas exploration or
production using hydraulic
fracturing.
This New Jersey bill was introduced in
both houses in January 2012. This bill
aggressively regulates a byproduct of
fracking, making fracking very difficult.
The bill was vetoed twice and then
reintroduced after a slight retweaking,
where it still sits in committee.
Natural gas public utilities; rates and
charges.
This Kansas House bill was introduced in 2011
to change the way that natural gas utilities
changed their pricing. The indirect effect on
natural gas extraction was probably small.
The bill never made it past committee.
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Bill Title Explanation
Natural gas fueling stations; tax
credit for certain owners of
stations that are open to the
public.
A 50% reduction in taxes associated
with fueling stations, for natural gas
stations. This bill died in a Virginia
commitee in 2015.
Establishing a committee to study the
safe delivery of oil and gas, including
natural gas and propane, throughout the
state of New Hampshire and making a
technical correction in the oil pipeline
facility spill response plan.
This bill was signed into New Hampshire law
in August 2014. The committee released its
final report in 2015, making some
recommendations for the clarification and
intensification of the existing regulatory
structure.
Resolve, to establish a moratorium
on the assessment of large volume
consumers by gas utilities and to
evaluate cost-effective natural gas
conservation and efficiency
improvements for large volume
consumers
A 2015 bill to prevent large (industrial)
gas consumers from benefiting from
Maine’s “natural gas conservation
fund.” The bill was ultimately vetoed.
A bill for an Act to provide for a
legislative management study of
reduction of the flaring of natural gas.
Flaring gas is a practice used by the natural
gas industry to ease well pressures, but it
pollutes the air. This North Dakota bill would
have looked into reducing gas flaring. The bill




Relating to a study regarding the
odorization of natural gas
transported in gathering and
transmission lines located in
populated areas.
This bill would look into creating more
regulations for natural gas sold to
consumers. This is a consumer safety
issue, but the bill died in a Texas
House committee in 2011.
A Resolution supporting continued and
increased development and delivery of
oil derived from North American oil
reserves to American refineries and
urging the President and Congress of the
United States to support the continued
and increased production and use of
American natural gas.
This bill was a sort of empty gesture towards
pro-natural-gas sentiments. The bill died in
Pennsylvania committee in 2013.
Exp. of Natural Gas & Propane
for Agriculture.
This bill made funding available for
natural gas infrastructure projects
relating to agriculture in North
Carolina in 2013.
Conversion of vehicles to compressed
natural gas; creating the County Fleet
Vehicle Compressed Natural Gas
Conversion Funding Act of 2014.
Emergency.
This bill was never fully fleshed out, but had
the potential to increase natural gas demand.




An act relating to the taxation of
natural gas infrastructure
A bill to revamp the way that natural
gas facilities and transmission lines
were taxed: all tax revenue would go to
a Clean Energy Development Fund to
help the areas around natural gas
facilities. This bill died in a Vermont
committee in 2014.
Providing sales and use tax exemptions,
in the form of a remittance of tax paid,
to encourage coal-fired electric
generation plants to convert to natural
gas-fired plants or biomass energy
facilities.
This Washington bill was first introduced in
2015 to encourage coal plants to switch to
natural gas or biomass. The bill has seen
majority support but was punted and
reintroduced several times, where it was last
seen in March 2016.
Relating to the recovery of certain
natural gas distribution utility
ratemaking proceeding expenses;
adding provisions subject to a
criminal penalty.
A small tweak to the way gas utilities
charge consumers in the state of Texas.
This bill died in committee in 2015.
An act prohibiting the storage or
disposal of waste from hydraulic
fracturing and natural gas and oil
extraction activities.
This Connecticut bill would make fracking
and other natural gas extraction more difficult.
The bill was introduced in January 2017, and
is pending further progress in committee.
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